Somalia’s Political Ark: Rivals United Under One Tent

By Ahmed Omar

Somalia’s journey since gaining independence in 1960 has been a tapestry woven with threads of democratic aspiration, authoritarian rule, and periods of profound fragmentation. Emerging from the colonial shadows of Italy in the south and Britain in the north, the First Republic of Somalia initially shone as a beacon of nascent democracy. Its first president held the distinction of being the first African head of state both democratically elected and peacefully removed from power on the continent – a testament to early democratic ideals taking root.

However, this promising trajectory faced a severe setback in 1969 with a military coup. The civilian government was overthrown, the constitution suspended, and Somalia declared itself a communist state, forging close ties with the Soviet bloc. While the early years of military rule saw some socio-economic advancements, they were ultimately overshadowed by rising corruption, nepotism, and deepening clan divisions, particularly felt in the peripheries. The devastating war with Ethiopia further weakened the state, paving the way for the rebel movements that ultimately ousted the military regime in 1991, plunging Somalia into nearly a decade of anarchy.

The year 2000 marked the cautious dawn of the Third Republic, born from reconciliation efforts in Djibouti. Yet, this new entity grappled with fundamental challenges: a struggle for authority against defiant warlords and a political system tethered to an indirect, clan-based “4.5” power-sharing formula rather than institutional strength and universal suffrage.

Today, Somalia stands at a critical juncture, contemplating a monumental shift from this indirect system towards the principle of one person, one vote (1P1V) for nationwide elections potentially as early as next year. This proposed transition, championed by the current administration under President Hassan Sheikh, is met with fierce debate. Proponents argue it is a necessary step towards genuine democratic representation, while opponents raise stark concerns about the nation’s capacity to manage such a transition amidst persistent security challenges and logistical hurdles, viewing the push as a potential maneuver to consolidate power or mishandle the electoral process. In line with this democratic aspiration, the government is encouraging political stakeholders to form parties and prepare for the 2026 polls.

It is within this complex and often volatile environment that a significant political development has recently occurred: the announcement of a new, large-scale political entity, the Justice and Solidarity Party, spearheaded by President Hassan Sheikh himself.

What commands particular analytical attention regarding this new party is the seemingly improbable coalition of political figures it has managed to assemble under one banner. It appears the President has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to convene and mobilize individuals who have historically occupied opposing corners of Somalia’s often fractious political arena. The formation of this party has brought together figures previously seen as deeply entrenched rivals, akin to bringing together the proverbial ‘cats and mice’ or, as the Somali public narrative vividly puts it, the ‘foxes and goats on the same boat without guards.’

Consider the intricate dynamics within just one region, Galmudug. The party’s Secretary General, Abdirahman Mohmaed Hussein (Odawaa), and the President of Galmudug state, Ahmed Abdi Karie (Qoorqoor), share a history of fierce competition, including a direct contest for the Galmudug presidency where they were often seen as mutually exclusive forces in high political forums. Adding another layer of complexity, Mahad Mohamed Salad, the former national intelligence chief who notably vacated his position to challenge Qoorqoor for the Galmudug presidency is also now a member of this same party. The political optics of Odawaa serving as party Secretary General while Qoorqoor remains a member despite holding a federal state presidency, alongside Qoorqoor’s past and present rival Mahad Salad, creates a fascinating and unexpected configuration.

On another front, the alignment within the Southwest state delegation is equally striking. The current Speaker of the Federal Parliament, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur (Madobe), and the President of the Southwest state, H.E Abdulaziz Hassan Mohamed (Lafta-gareen), have been significant competitors for influence and the mantle of representing the state’s interests at the federal level. Each has asserted their position as the primary figure to be dealt with in federal-state relations concerning the Southwest. Their presence together within the same political party is a notable convergence given their history of vying for dominance.

Adding further depth to this complex mosaic from the Southwest, the former Defense Minister, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur (Jamac), also joins this party. A young yet politically strong figure, he managed to remain at the helm of the Defense Ministry for quite long time despite significant opposition from both Speaker Madobe and President Laftagareen, who reportedly felt his position should have required their assent. His ability to maintain his federal Ministerial role without their blessing, attributed by some to external connections, marked him as an emerging power center seemingly capable of operating outside or even challenging the influence of both regional heavyweights. His inclusion alongside Madobe and Lafta-gareen adds another layer of unexpected cohabitation.

Furthermore, the inclusion of Mukhtar Robow adds a dimension rooted in recent historical grievance. A figure with significant grassroots support in the Southwest, Robow was a primary competitor to Laftagareen in the Southwest presidential election. Many believed he was the favored candidate before a controversial intervention by the previous administration, which saw Robow arrested, effectively clearing the path for Laftagareen’s victory. Having felt alienated from the current administration (which included figures like Madobe and Laftagareen), Robow’s willingness to join a party co-led by the current Southwest president and including these individuals marks a potentially significant political reconciliation or strategic calculation. He has notably not visited Baidoa since his controversial arrest, underscoring the depth of the past grievance.

Bringing together such a diverse group of individuals with interwoven histories of rivalry, competition for power, and past grievances – figures who have actively worked against each other or represented competing power bases – suggests that the formation of the Justice and Solidarity Party was a political undertaking requiring considerable effort, negotiation, and strategic maneuvering by President Hassan Sheikh. The sheer complexity of these relationships underscores the remarkable nature of this political convergence.

The emergence of this consolidated political force presents a significant strategic challenge to the existing opposition landscape. It raises a critical question: Can the various opposition factions overcome their own fragmentation to forge a competing front capable of facing this new alignment, or will they persist in their organizational divisions, bound instead by the locally understood tactic known as “WASHAMSI”? This strategy, often employed despite individual ambitions for higher office, represents a unity based solely on shared opposition to the incumbent administration.

The formation of the Justice and Solidarity Party, therefore, is not merely the launch of another political group, but rather a potent demonstration of political maneuvering that has successfully bridged deep-seated divides. This capacity to unify previously discordant voices under a single political roof represents a significant, and for many, surprising, development in Somalia’s ever-evolving political landscape. Its impact on the path towards one person, one vote and the 2026 elections remain a critical factor to watch.